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Case Notes
FREE MOVEMENT AND ROADBLOCKS: THE RIGHT TO
PROTEST IN THE SINGLE MARKET
Case C-112/00 Schmidberger Internationale Transporte and Planzüge v Austria
[2003] ECR I-5659
Free movement of goods and environmental protection, fundamental rights and the actions of
individuals, proportionality
FACTS
Eugen Schmidberger brought proceedings against the Republic of Austria alleging that the
(in)action of authorities in that state had frustrated the right of his haulage company from
carrying out its business, that is to say moving goods between Germany and Italy.
Schmidberger lorries were kept stationary at the Austrian frontier for four consecutive days
because of a combination of restrictions on heavy goods vehicle movements during weekends
and bank holidays, and the activities of an environmental group, Transitforum Austria Tirol,
which had organised a protest on the A13 motorway on the one working day between the
relevant bank holiday and weekend.
Transitforum Austria Tirol, no doubt fully aware that the timing of its protest would result in
the effective closure of the motorway for a period well beyond the actual duration of the
demonstration, organised a mini-festival on the arterial route linking northern Italy with
southern Germany. Picnics, children’s parties, fun and games took the place of the usual
traffic, the demonstration intended to make a statement about the need to reclaim the
streets from vehicles.
The Austrian authorities considered that the demonstration satisfied the requirements of
the relevant laws on assembly,1 and therefore upheld the rights of those individuals involved
to participate in this protest. It seemed, however, that the authorities gave little thought to
whether any point of Community law was raised by this action, or if they did consider it they
concluded they still had to permit the closure of the road.
Schmidberger then sued the Austrian Republic in Austrian courts for damages under the
state liability heading of Community law. Damages were sought to compensate the haulier
for losses suffered while its lorries were prevented from using the A13 in contravention of
Community free movement rights as set out in Articles 28 and 29 of the European Community
1 Paragraphs 2, 6 and 16 of the Versammlungsgesetz (Law on assembly) of 1953, as amended; paras 42
and 86 of the Straßenverkehrsordnung (Highway Code) of 1960, as amended.
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Treaty (EC), and the Republic’s duty under Article 10 EC of loyalty to the Community order.
The action was dismissed by the Tyrolean lower courts on the grounds that Schmidberger
had known about the intended protest and taken no action to change its lorries’ routes or
somehow otherwise to avoid its losses. An appeal hearing on whether Schmidberger’s lack of
mitigating action denied the company the right to assert its Community law rights was
stayed when the higher court referred questions to the European Court of Justice for a
preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC.
The Court of Justice considered the merits of both the freedom to move goods around the
single market,2 and the rights of protestors to assemble.3 The Court considered whether the
two can be ‘balanced’,4 and whether breach of the former gave rise to state liability in
damages,5 concluding that a breach of free movement rights was exactly the sort of thing
the doctrine of state liability was intended to remedy.
It was held that this protest was a restriction on the rights of Schmidberger to move goods
around the market,6 and that the Austrian authorities were under a duty to take all appropriate
measures to ensure the freedom of traders to move goods around their territory.7
That being so, protest was considered, however, to be a justifiable limitation on the free
movement standard since the right to assemble is upheld by Articles 10 and 11 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The Court of Justice
affirmed the role the European Convention plays in the Community legal order, with the
respect of its provisions a ‘general principle’ of Community law.8 In the light of the wide
margin of appreciation accorded to states seeking to uphold Articles 10 and 11 ECHR
rights,9 and in the light of the proportional response from the Austrian authorities to the
organisation of the Transitforum Austria Tirol protest,10 the failure to keep the A13 open
to traffic did not amount to a breach of Article 28 EC free movement rights or Article 10
state loyalty obligations, and therefore could not give rise to any liability on the part of the
Republic to the haulier.11
COMMENT
Schmidberger is one of the European Court of Justice’s showier judgments. It is a ruling that
asks to be noticed, and not just for the quality of its argument and reasoning. At the time of
the European Union’s largest expansion, it is interesting to note the impact accession countries
have upon the development of the Community legal order. Austria was one of the new
members before May 2004, and Schmidberger is a case where the unresolved disputes
surrounding accession were given a further airing, with somewhat surprising consequences
for both free movement law and the common transport policy. This case is just another
example of how accession of states to the Union adds to its legal culture.
The particular impact of Austrian accession can be identified in the large number of
preliminary references from Austrian courts on the contested and somewhat confused
2 At paras 47 to 64 of the judgment.
3 At paras 73 to 80 of the judgment.
4 At paras 81 to 82 of the judgment.
5 At paras 22 and 95 of the judgment.
6 At para. 64 of the judgment.
7 At paras. 60 to 64 of the judgment.
8 At para. 71 of the judgment.
9 At para. 82 of the judgment.
10 At para. 87 of the judgment.
11 At para. 94 of the judgment.
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question of state liability for breaches of Community law.12 Indeed, Schmidberger itself is
largely grounded on these complexities. But Schmidberger is also an environmental law case,
and in particular an environmental law case that raises some profound questions as to the
relationship between fundamental rights and the free trading foundational freedoms of
Community law.
That such questions should emanate from the Tyrol is unsurprising to all those who are
acquainted with the debate in Austria as the Republic considered Union membership. The
prospect of Community legal norms overruling hard-won environmental standards was
manifested in the ‘No’ campaign fought on transport, agricultural and nuclear policy grounds
when membership was put to the vote prior to accession. No doubt other national issues will
return to the agenda raised by the post-May 2004 states, whatever the resolution of these
issues in their accession Treaties. The interesting thing about this is that Schmidberger
evidences the fluid nature of even settled law. Those expecting that the fundamental freedom
to move goods around the single market largely trumped every other consideration have
been given a clear signal that PreussenElektra13 was not an aberration – the Court of Justice
is willing to move some distance from its protection of the rights of traders as formulated in
seminal cases such as Dassonville14 in the interests of environmental protection.
And there are environmental problems directly caused by the sheer volume of traffic in the
Tyrol. The main transit route between Italy and Germany is the A13/A12 Tyrol corridor
linking the Brenner Pass with Kufstein. It was estimated in 1994 that over 80 per cent of this
road’s traffic was in transit. Growth in traffic crossing the Alps has been relentless, and the
impact of Austrian accession to the Union in 1995 is quite marked. In 1994 Alpine north-
south merchandise traffic (traversing at any point between Ventimiglia and Vienna) amounted
to 132.8 million tonnes,15 45 per cent of which crossed Austria.16 The Brenner Pass absorbed
35 per cent of all Alpine transit17 when there are 18 recognised crossing routes, and at a time
when Austria was not yet bound by the common transport policy. By 1998, the Brenner Pass
and Tyrol corridor were taking 40 per cent of all Alpine goods road traffic, the increased
share a simple consequence of three years of membership of the European Union with
increased trade volumes. Debates in the European Parliament in 2003 noted that by 2001
traffic crossing Austria had increased by 50 per cent of 1991 figures.18
Traffic volume is easily linked to environmental concern, and widespread concern is as good
a cause as any for protest. The demonstrations on the A13 were then motivated by causes
that can be understood by all those interested in protecting the environment, and no doubt
even those sitting in the Court of Justice in Luxembourg.
That being said, it is of course easy to recognise that the situation in Schmidberger presented
the Court with little by way of choice. A judgment that held the temporary closure of a
12 See, for example, case C-302/97 Konle v Austria [1999] ECR I-3099, case C-140/97 Rechberger and
others v Austria [1999] ECR I-3499 and then the really quite remarkable judgment in case C-224/01
Köbler v Austria [2003] ECR I (no page reference yet — see www.curia.eu.int for a transcript of the
judgment) on state liability for judgments of supreme courts that may give rise to damages for
contravening Community law standards.
13 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099.
14 Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837.
15 GS EVED (Swiss Transport Service) Alpenquerender Güterverhehr auf Straße und Schiene 1994 (Trans-
Alpine Goods Traffic by Road and Rail 1994), Bern: GS EVED, 1995.
16 Ibid. at XV; 29 per cent crossed France and 26 per cent Switzerland.
17 Ibid.
18 European Parliament sitting 11 February 2003, see www3.europarl.eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/
debatsL5?FILE=20030211EN&LANGUE=EN&LEVEL=DOC&NUMINT=2-162.
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motorway fell foul of the right to move goods would have left the Court exposed to the
obvious question: why should states with motorways (transit, European or otherwise) be
under greater obligations as to the need to keep trade moving than those who never bothered
to build such routes? But Schmidberger is interesting because the Court of Justice goes well
beyond accepting that which cannot be avoided. The ruling clearly sets out a certain
acceptance that there are rights to assemble and protest, that such rights frustrate other
rights to trade or move freely, but the Community legal order will not just seek to balance
the two. The Community legal order acknowledges that sometimes the right to protest
outweighs all other considerations, even foundational trading freedoms.19 In so doing the
Court of Justice made clear the distinction between the Tyrolean demonstration and French
farmers’ violent and destructive protests over the import of Spanish strawberries and Belgian
tomatoes condemned in the Commission v France judgment.20 There the French authorities
had been found not to have done enough to protect single market (presumably Spanish and
Belgian) traders’ rights. Presumably, the French campaign was thought to be motivated by
a prejudice that struck to the heart of the single market concept, and the response of the
relevant authorities was widely considered to be minimal. The Tyrolean protest was different.
The environmental credentials of the organisers were noted,21 and efforts made by the
Austrian authorities to publicise the road-closure were cited approvingly. The suspicion
remains though that the difference between a protest by the well-dressed and better behaved
Tyrolean compared to the rurally attired and more désagréable French farmer is not so great.
The French farmer’s reputation somehow goes before him. Austrian environmentalists manage
to make their green seem a very different shade to khaki.
At exactly what point the state falls under a duty to maintain traders’ freedoms in the light
of organised protest is not clear. Suffice it to say all states have a duty to do something about
their citizens’ actions when disruption to the single market is threatened. That much is
certain following Commission v France. And then, well-organised protest about a legitimate
complaint, be it heavy traffic in the Alps or be it other as yet unrecognised grounds, can
disrupt the single market. That is the result of Schmidberger.
It seems there is a certain quality to environmental protest that the Court is willing to
accept. It is unlikely that a degree of divergence on the sorts of protests disrupting the single
market is what the Court has in mind. That is to say, it could be argued that protest motivated
by environmentalism in Austria and pro-life campaigns in Ireland are able to outweigh
single market freedoms there since each provokes passion in its national context. Perhaps
then environmentally motivated disruptions to trade in Italy or pro-life protests in clinics in
Britain are not so acceptable because environmentalists in Italy and pro-lifers in Britain just
do not have the same credentials. This is surely not what the Court intends. The result would
soon be a choice for the authorities in each Member State as to when and where to protect
single market traders’ rights and perhaps many would see this as an opportunity to do
nothing. So it is probably not because environmental protection is important to Austrians
that the Tyrol protest was thought acceptable. It is difficult to establish whether
environmental protection as threatened by trans-border transit traffic is more important to
Austrians than the rural way of life as threatened by trans-border trade in produce is to
French farmers.
Acceptable protest affecting the single market must then be more to do with the type of
protest envisaged and the way it is implemented. The conclusion to that then is that perhaps
19 At para. 90 of the judgment.
20 Case C-265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959.
21 At para. 10 of the judgment.
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the French farmers need to be more environmental in their objectives. Perhaps targeting
Spanish produce from the Canaries would be acceptable since Greenpeace’s challenge to
European Union funding of the construction of power stations on Tenerife and Gran Canaria,22
but not Spanish produce from environmentally friendlier sources.
Certainly the considered inaction of the Austrian authorities was thought better of than the
more sporadic action of the French authorities, in their different scenarios. In particular
the lodging of a request for permission to demonstrate on the motorway and the subsequent
publicity and/or notification of the demonstration to all those who may be interested or
affected by it in Austria, Germany and Italy was taken as evidence of an altogether more
proportionate expression of Article 10 and 11 ECHR rights. It is, though, a question for the
Court to consider if well-organised disruption is conceptually different to poorly organised
disruption, whatever the relative merits of either. It is not clear that the European Court of
Human Rights case law on Articles 10 and 11 ECHR should disenfranchise the wrong sort of
protest any more than it should exclude protests on the wrong sort of subject.
The Court does note that the freedoms to protest and assemble, as expressed in Articles 10
and 11 ECHR, are themselves couched in limitations that perhaps go some way to assisting
in the navigation of the line between Schmidberger and Commission v France.  This is simply
put as the recognition within the Convention right that each state can limit the expression of
this right to the extent the limitation is necessary in a democratic society. The Court of
Justice then cites the ‘wide margin of appreciation’ afforded to states to define what these
limits should be,23 in its approving comments of the Austrian authorities’ response to the
Tyrolean demonstration. But it is submitted that this does not really take us much further
forward. It is still not clear why some protests can frustrate single market freedoms and
when some go too far. It is not as though Commission v France was overruled in Schmidberger.
Indeed, it was affirmed.24
That being so, there is still something particular about the Tyrolean problem because of its
exceptional location in between German and Italian trading giants, and amidst a supposedly
fragile ecological landscape upon which much of the region depends for its livelihood.25 It
must also be noted that the environment is acknowledged both in the EC Treaty,26 and in
Court of Justice case law,27 whereas the Court has never taken kindly to any form of action
that smells of nationality discrimination.28
Further, the problem of transit through the Tyrol is in fact acknowledged by special rules
applying to vehicles in clear derogation to the general free movement framework and in
particular exception to the common transport policy. A Regulation permits the continued
requirement of ‘eco-points’ for heavy goods vehicles crossing Austria, calculated in such a
22 See case C-321/95 P Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) and Others v Commission
[1998] ECR I-1651.
23 At paras 77 and 80 of the Schmidberger judgment.
24 At para. 86.
25 Agriculture is obviously affected by environmental factors. Tourism is, though, a significant factor in
the Tyrolean economy, and perceived threats to summer and winter attractions caused by
environmental degradation are taken very seriously.
26 Article 6 EC sets out a general principle of sustainability, while Art. 174 EC empowers the Community
in its environmental policy.
27 Numerous decisions take note of the significance of environmental protection, from PreussenElektra,
cited above, right back to the case 302/86 Commission v Denmark [1988] ECR 4607 judgment on the
proportionality of recycling schemes affecting the quantity of drinks sold in the common market.
28 Again, numerous cases could be cited here. But this is the justification for affirming Commission v
France in Schmidberger.
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29 European Parliament and Council Regulation 2327/2003/EC on a transitional points system applicable
to heavy goods vehicles travelling through Austria for 2004 within the framework of a sustainable
transport policy (OJ L345/30 2003).
30 Transit Treaty between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Austria (then a
non-Member State) (OJ L373/22 1992), with the eco-points scheme implemented by Council
Regulation 3637/92/EEC (OJ L373/1 1992) Annex I.
31 Protocol XI (in particular Article 11 and Annex 4) of the Act concerning the conditions of accession
of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of
Sweden and the adjustment to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded (OJ C241/08
1994).
32 See the House of Lords judgment in R v Chief Constable of Sussex ex p. International Trader’s Ferry Ltd
[1999] 2 AC 418. Here the possible infringement of the Art. 29 EC freedom to export was thought
subject to police discretion motivated by factors such as the police budget. But if Schmidberger is
applied, the right to trade itself can be offset by the right to protest.
way as to restrict the volume of vehicles and thereby the levels of emitting pollutants.29 This
is in fact a continuation of an older scheme,30 that was then annexed to the Accession Treaty
when Austria joined the Union,31 but which was then supposed to expire in December 2003.
The interaction between Community law standards and the European Convention is one of
the most notable outcomes of this judgment and it is interesting to consider exactly what
else might follow from this line of authority. It could then be that English protests on the
trade in livestock, so long as motivated by animal welfare, should no longer be an issue of
police discretion somehow outside of the ambit of Article 29 EC, but instead be firmly
located within Community law as an example of a limitation on free movement justified by
the right to protest.32 Perhaps privacy rights under Article 8 ECHR will lead to other trading
limitations, with potential impact no doubt on competition law. What is clearest in Schmidberger
is that the Court of Justice is willing to hear arguments on both environmental protection
and fundamental rights even when they limit the foundational freedoms of the single market.
Matthew Humphreys
University of Surrey
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HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE BALANCE – HATTON AND
MARCIC
Hatton v United Kingdom [2004] 1 All ER 135
Marcic v Thames Water (2003) 37 EHRR 28
Human rights, discretion of regulator, balance of economic and susceptible individual’s interests,
doctrine of the margin of appreciation, environmental rights
FACTS
Hatton v United Kingdom1
The litigation in Hatton v United Kingdom was brought by Ms Hatton and seven other members
of the Heathrow Association for the Control of Aircraft Noise (HACAN-ClearSkies),
represented by the leading environmental litigator, Richard Buxton. Their claim was that
Government policy on night flights at Heathrow airport violated their rights under Article 8
of the Convention and that they were denied an effective domestic remedy for this complaint,
contrary to Article 13 of the Convention.
The claim was lodged in May 1997 and held to be admissible in May 2000, and was first
considered by the Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ‘the Chamber’)
who held, in November 2001, that there had been a violation of Article 8 (by five votes to
two) and that there had been a violation of Article 13 (by six votes to one). The Chamber also
decided (by six votes to one) to award each applicant £4,000 as compensation for non-
pecuniary damages including a payment for costs.2 The UK judge, Sir Brian Kerr, dissented
on all three of these decisions and in December 2001 the UK Government asked for them to
be referred to the Grand Chamber (hereafter ‘the Grand Chamber’) pursuant to Article 43
of the Convention and Rule 73, a request that was accepted in March 2002. The hearing took
place in November 2002 and when the Grand Chamber gave its judgment in July 2003, it
found in favour of the Government on Article 8 (by 12 votes to five) and in favour of the
applicants on Article 13 (by 16 votes to one), thereby concluding the six-year ECHR process.
Marcic v Thames Water3
Peter Marcic brought a claim against Thames Water for the serious and repeated external
sewer flooding he had suffered at his home, where he had lived for over 20 years. The
flooding resulted from overflow from public sewers, adequate when laid (assumed to be in
the 1930s) but subsequently overwhelmed because of increased housing development. Mr
Marcic’s house, at the low point of the drainage system, had been repeatedly flooded (the
House of Lords identified up to 17 occasions when this had happened between 1992 and
2000) and this had caused the acknowledged damp and subsidence to the property as well as
possible structural damage. Mr Marcic had mitigated his losses by constructing his own
flood defence system, at a cost of £16,000, works which, their Lordships acknowledged, were
the sole reason why floodwater no longer entered the curtilage of his home. In 1998 Mr
Marcic began his action against Thames Water in nuisance and under the newly introduced
1 [2004] 1 All ER 135.
2 For an analysis of this case see Antonia Layard, ‘Night Flights: A Surprising Victory – Hatton v United
Kingdom’, Env L Rev 4 (2002) 51.
3 (2003) 37 EHRR 28.
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Human Rights Act for a mandatory order compelling Thames Water to improve the sewerage
system and damages. At both first instance and in the Court of Appeal Mr Marcic was
successful,4 initially under the 1998 Act and subsequently under both principles of common
law and under the Act. Ultimately, however, Mr Marcic failed in his action before the House
of Lords.
DECISION IN HATTON
As in the earlier litigation, the key policy the applicants complained of in Hatton was the
1993 scheme for regulating night flights at Heathrow. The Grand Chamber in 2003 accepted
that there was harm, finding that the implementation of this scheme was ‘susceptible of
adversely affecting the quality of the applicants’ private life and the scope for their enjoying
the amenities of their respective homes, and thus their rights protected by Article 8 of the
Convention’. Indeed they held (a conclusion with which the Government agreed) that
sensitivity to noise includes a subjective element, with a small minority of people being
more likely than others to be awoken or otherwise disturbed in their sleep by aircraft noise
at night.5 The Grand Chamber accepted that these individuals constituted part of this minority
even though it felt itself unable to make a definitive decision about whether the noise levels
deteriorated after the 1993 scheme was implemented.6 Nevertheless, the majority concluded
that in implementing the 1993 scheme, the authorities had not overstepped their margin of
appreciation and that regulators had not, in their view, failed to strike a fair balance between
the right of the individuals affected by those regulations to respect for their private life and
home, and the conflicting interests of others and of the community as a whole. Accordingly,
the majority found no violation of Article 8.
The Grand Chamber did find, however, with only Sir Brian Kerr dissenting,7 that there had
been a breach of Article 13,8 concluding that in this instance judicial review had not been an
effective remedy in relation to their arguable9 rights under Article 8 of the Convention. This
was an argument the Chamber had also upheld and the Grand Chamber agreed that since
the aircraft operator had complied with the 1993 scheme and the relevant regulations, no
action lay in trespass or nuisance in respect of lawful night flights since the Civil Aviation
Act 1982, s. 76 prohibits actions in nuisance in respect of excessive noise caused by aircraft
at night. Noting the earlier divergent decisions on the adequacy of judicial review,10 the
Grand Chamber agreed with the Government that judicial review proceedings could be
effective, for instance by establishing that the 1993 scheme was unlawful because the gap
between Government policy and practice was too wide.11 However, they concluded that:
it is clear, as noted by the Chamber, that the scope of review by the domestic courts was limited to
the classic English public law concepts, such as irrationality, unlawfulness and patent
4 For an analysis of the Court of Appeal decision see William Howarth, ‘Flood Defence Law after
Marcic’, Env L Rev 5 (2003) 23.
5 At para. 118.
6 At para. 124. The Court eventually brushed aside concerns about special sensitivity, concluding that
in coming to a ‘balanced’ decision, the Government was entitled in this context to rely on ‘statistical
data based on average perception of noise disturbance’, para. 125.
7 Sir Brian Kerr was the sole dissenter.
8 ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an
effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed
by persons acting in an official capacity.’
9 According to earlier jurisprudence, a remedy in domestic law is required only in respect of grievances
which can be regarded as ‘arguable’ in terms of the Convention (citing Boyle and Rice v The United
Kingdom, 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, § 54), see para. 139.
10 See Vilvarajah and Others v The United Kingdom of 30 October 1991, Series A no. 215, and Smith and
Grady v The United Kingdom of 27 September 1999, ECHR 1999-VI.
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unreasonableness, and did not at the time (that is, prior to the entry into force of the Human
Rights Act 1998) allow consideration of whether the claimed increase in night flights under the
1993 Scheme represented a justifiable limitation on the right to respect for the private and family
lives or the homes of those who live in the vicinity of Heathrow airport.12
Consequently, the Grand Chamber found that the scope of review by the domestic courts in
the present case was not sufficient to comply with Article 13 though it concluded that the
finding of a violation in itself constituted adequate just satisfaction in respect of any non-
pecuniary damage and, more significant for the applicants still, reduced the award of costs
considerably.13
DECISION IN MARCIC
The primary reason for the rejection of Mr Marcic’s claim in nuisance14 by the House of
Lords was that his cause of action here was simply ‘inconsistent with the statutory scheme’,
since in order to achieve a fair system of priorities, balancing is inevitable and whether ‘the
system adopted by a sewerage undertaker is fair is a matter inherently more suited for
decision by the industry regulator than by a court’.15 Indeed, according to the House of
Lords, a statutory remedy existed for cases of unfairness, since the Water Resources Act
1991, s. 94(3) provides that the only way to enforce a sewerage undertaker’s duty to provide
an adequate system of public sewers under s. 94(1) is by the Director acting under s. 18, in
accordance with a general authorisation given by the Secretary of State. There is no direct
remedy in common law, having been specifically excluded by the statutory scheme.
The problem for Mr Marcic was that, even though Lord Nicholls accepted that there had
been a prima facie contravention of s. 94, since Thames Water had not complied with the
provision requiring every sewerage undertaker ‘to provide, improve and extend such a system
of public sewers (whether inside its area or elsewhere) and so to cleanse and maintain those
sewers as to ensure that that area is and continues to be effectually drained’, the Director
had made no such order.16 Since no enforcement order had been made, the only option Mr
Marcic had was to bring an action for judicial review against the Director or the Secretary of
State for failing to do so, a course of action Mr Marcic did not pursue.
To some extent then, Lord Nicholls dismissed the case on the basis that the wrong remedy
had been sought; that an application should have been made for judicial review rather than
for damages. In practice, of course, had this path been pursued, Mr Marcic would also have
had little chance of success since a similar balancing exercise would have been undertaken,
to determine whether Thames Water’s action had been irrational, unlawful or patently
unreasonable. As one commentator has noted, Mr Marcic’s central argument was ‘that he should
have been higher up in the queue for resources than he obviously was’.17 This is naturally a
question of regulatory discretion and one that would not necessarily have been altered by a court.
On the human rights point, the House of Lords did hold that the flooding of Mr Marcic’s
property fell within the first paragraph of Article 8 and also within Article 1 of the First
Protocol. Indeed, the House of Lords confirmed that serious interference of this nature with
11 See R v  Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Richmond LBC (No. 2) [1995] Environmental Law
Reports, 390.
12 At para. 141.
13 These were payable by the Government, but were reduced from £70,000 to 50,000 euros (para. 148).
14 For a thorough discussion of the common law points see David Howarth, ‘Nuisance and the House of
Lords: Squaring the Triangle’ (2004) Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 16(2), 233.
15 At para. 38.
16 As required under s. 94(1)(a).
17 ‘Sewerage Systems, Nuisance and Human Rights’ (2004) Housing Law Monitor, Vol. 11.1(4).
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a person’s home was ‘a prima facie violation of a person’s right to respect for his private and
family life (Article 8) and of his entitlement to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions
(Article 1 of the First Protocol)’. As they confirmed, the ‘burden of justifying this interference
rests on Thames Water’.18 Nevertheless, despite this initial interpretation, the House of
Lords rejected Mr Marcic’s claim under the HRA 1998, because, according to Lord Nicholls,
who gave the leading judgment, the same ‘fatal weakness’ affected this submission as his
claim in nuisance, namely, that the claim ‘does not take sufficient account of the statutory
scheme under which Thames Water is operating the offending sewers’.
Like Hatton then, the House of Lords in Marcic denied a susceptible individual a remedy
because the regulator had to be allowed to exercise his discretion as he saw fit. It was the
Director’s role to balance the different interests of the majority (Thames Water and sewerage
customers in general) against the effects on susceptible individuals. When analysing the
case in the context of human rights, the question for Lord Nicholls was whether ‘the statutory
scheme as a whole, of which this enforcement procedure is part, [was] Convention-
compliant’,19 a question he answered affirmatively.
To reach this decision, Lord Nicholls relied specifically on the 2003 decision in Hatton, noting
that here, the ‘court emphasised “the fundamentally subsidiary nature” of the Convention’.
In his view:
[n]ational authorities have ‘direct democratic legitimation’ and are in principle better placed
than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions. In matters of general policy,
on which opinions within a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, ‘the role of the
domestic policy maker should be given special weight’ … A fair balance must be struck between
the interests of the individual and of the community as a whole.
Consequently, he concluded, the balancing decisions were for the regulator to take:20 it is not
for the courts to intervene and protect the apparently violated property rights of the minority.
This was also the view of Lord Hoffman, who relied on Hatton to hold that:
the Convention does not accord absolute protection to property or even to residential premises.
It requires a fair balance to be struck between the interests of persons whose homes and property
are affected and the interests of other people, such as customers and the general public. National
institutions, and particularly the national legislature, are accorded a broad discretion in choosing
the solution appropriate to their own society or creating the machinery for doing so. There is no
reason why Parliament should not entrust such decisions to an independent regulator such as the
Director. He is a public authority within the meaning of the 1998 Act and has a duty to act in
accordance with Convention rights.21
ANALYSIS
One of the central issues raised and the clear overlap between the decisions in Marcic and
Hatton is the question of how different interests should be balanced and the way in which
the courts deal with economic interests on the one hand and violations of individuals’ interests
(whether or not these constitute rights under Article 8) on the other. In the context of the
ECtHR this inevitably entails a consideration of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation
and reflection on the development of ‘environmental rights’.
18 At para. 37.
19 At para. 40.
20 At para. 40.
21 At para. 71.
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Consequently, in Hatton a crucial question for the Grand Chamber was whether it was
legitimate under Article 8(2) to take into account the economic interests of aircraft
operators, passengers and the country as a whole when shaping its policy, while in Marcic
it was the scope of the Director’s discretion and the competing demands on Thames
Water, from customers, shareholders and susceptible individuals, that was key.
Conventionally, in the ECtHR jurisprudence on Article 8, the key consideration is a
state’s margin of appreciation, long applied to decisions on land-use. In Powell & Rayner
v UK, for example, the claimants failed in their application for redress for the noise
from Heathrow when the ECtHR held that in striking a ‘fair balance between the competing
interests of the individual and of the community as a whole ... the State enjoys a certain
margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with
the Convention’.22 The Court famously held that it was ‘certainly not for the Commission
or the Court to substitute for the assessment of the national authorities any other
assessment of what might be the best policy in this difficult social and technical sphere’,
concluding that ‘this is an area where the Contracting States are to be recognised as enjoying
a wide margin of appreciation’.23
In Hatton in 2003, the Grand Chamber considered the doctrine and concluded that a fair
balance had been struck, and did not believe (as the Chamber had found) that the nature of
the intrusion here called for ‘an especially narrow scope of the State’s margin of appreciation’,24
holding that:
the normal rule applicable to general policy decisions would seem to be pertinent here, the more
so as this rule can be invoked even in relation to individually addressed measures taken in the
framework of a general policy25 …Whilst the State is required to give due consideration to the
particular interests the respect for which it is obliged to secure by virtue of Article 8, it must in
principle be left a choice between different ways and means of meeting this obligation. The
Court’s supervisory function being of a subsidiary nature, it is limited to reviewing whether or not
the particular solution adopted can be regarded as striking a fair balance.26
It was this characterisation of the Court’s supervisory function as being ‘subsidiary’ that so
caught the eye of the House of Lords in Marcic.27
The problem with relying on this doctrine, as commentators have noted time and again, is
that there is very little certainty or consistency in the ECtHR’s decision-making when it is
applied. Greer, for example, has argued that this reliance on the margin of appreciation
doctrine and the principle of balancing has been the reason for the ‘unprincipled and confused’
case law by the ECtHR on Articles 8–11,28 while McHarg has claimed that reliance on the
22 Powell and Rayner v United Kingdom (1990) 12 EHRR 355 at para. 41.
23 At para. 44 Powell and Rayner v UK (1987) 9 EHRR 241. See also Buckley v The United Kingdom, where
the applicant complained that she had been denied planning permission to install a residential
caravan on land that she owned, (1997) 23 EHRR 101.
24 As the Court had previously found in criminal cases, such as Dudgeon v The United Kingdom,
concerning sexual privacy, (1982) 4 EHRR 149.
25 In Buckley v The United Kingdom, for example, the applicant complained that she had been denied
planning permission to install a residential caravan on land that she owned, (1997) 23 EHRR 101.
26 At para. 123.
27 Indeed, as barristers David Hart QC and Marina Wheeler have put it, the fact that the Strasbourg
court’s was one of a supervisory and subsidiary nature, ‘we can hear these phrases ringing round the
Administrative Court for some time to come’, David Hart QC and Marina Wheeler, ‘Night Flights and
Strasbourg’s Retreat from Environmental Human Rights’ (2004) Journal of Environmental Law, Vol.
16(2), 100 at p. 134.
28 Steven Greer, ‘Constitutionalizing Adjudication under the European Convention on Human Rights’
(2003) OJLS Vol. 3, 405 at p. 433.
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doctrine limits the Court to a reactive, rather than a proactive, role.29 In Marcic, such concerns
were of course rejected with a robust reference to the consequence of ‘direct democratic
legitimation’, a conclusion echoing Lord Nolan’s previous dismissal of ‘the obvious unsuitability
of the courts as the arbiters in planning and related matters’ in Alconbury v DETR.30
The problem with this balancing approach is that it appears to require a level playing-field
for decision-makers, where neither rights nor the public interest have priority. As both
McHarg and Greer have eloquently argued, this risks relegating rights to little more than
interests and appears to deprive the Convention of any teleological purpose, which could be
to prioritise rights. Whether or not rights need to be ‘trumps’ is certainly still up for debate,
yet it is certainly difficult to see the decision Hatton in 2003 as anything else but a step in
favour of the public interest at the expense of individual rights. The majority in the Grand
Chamber certainly rejected the Chamber’s more protective approach to rights which had
required states ‘to minimise, as far as possible, the interference with [Article 8] rights, by
trying to find alternative solutions and by generally seeking to achieve their aims in the least
onerous way as regards human rights’,31 a conclusion Sir Brian Kerr had found so distasteful
in his 2001 dissent. Certainly, the 2003 minority reiterated the more protective approach. As
they asked rhetorically: ‘what do human rights pertaining to the privacy of the home mean
if day and night, constantly or intermittently, it reverberates with the roar of aircraft engines?’
They rejected the Grand Chamber’s judgment as a ‘step backwards’, giving ‘precedence to
economic considerations over basic health conditions in qualifying the applicants’ “sensitivity
to noise” as that of a small minority of people’, and, in their view, the ‘trend of playing down
such sensitivity … [and] turning against the current’.32
In procedural terms this difference of opinion could add up to a dispute over who should
bear the burden of proof, and it is clearly evident that a key difference between the two
courts was their willingness to accept the limited information both sides provided in support
of their claim. Undoubtedly the Chamber in 2001 felt that although the Government had
ostensibly weighed up economic, environmental and social claims, this had not been done in
a particularly thorough way and that there was even an element of lip-service to these
requirements. In 2003, meanwhile, the Grand Chamber was noticeably reluctant to press
the Government on the economic details of their arguments, requiring no additional research
on environmental and economic policy issues, holding that although ‘appropriate
investigations and studies’ must necessarily be undertaken in such contexts, ‘this does not
mean that decisions can only be taken if comprehensive and measurable data are available
in relation to each and every aspect of the matter to be decided’. 33 It is true that the applicants
as well did not submit evidence disproving ‘the Government’s indications as to the “objective”
daytime noise contour measured at each applicant’s home’.34 Nevertheless, although their
harm was acknowledged, it was of course held to be insufficient to win their case.
29 A. McHarg, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal
Uncertainties in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (1999) 62 MLR 671 at p.
691.
30 Alconbury v DETR [2003] 2 AC 295 at para. 60.
31 At para. 97, a statement vehemently opposed by Sir Brian Kerr in his dissent, who thought it an
unwarranted extension of the jurisprudence and one which could not be reconciled with the margin
of appreciation doctrine.
32 At paras. 1 and 5 of the dissent.
33 They ‘readily accepted’ that ‘there is an economic interest in maintaining a full service to London
from distant airports, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a clear line between the interests
of the aviation industry and the economic interests of the country as a whole’ without requiring
further studies (para. 126).
34 At para. 118.
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Unquestionably judges who found in favour of the Government were more prepared to take
the information submitted (such as it was) at face value. In 2001, for instance, Judge Greve
relied in her partial dissent on the margin of appreciation doctrine to claim that this in itself
was sufficient authority to be reluctant to press the Government for further facts:
The arguments listed above in favour of a wide margin of appreciation in planning cases also have
as a consequence that the Court ought to be reluctant to substitute its own assessment of facts in
these cases unless there are relatively clear and substantiated indications that the national
authorities have got the facts wrong. In my opinion, there are no such indications in the
present case which would make the Court a more competent fact-finder than the national
authorities.
Similarly, Sir Brian Kerr had been reluctant to press the Government for more information.
In his view, ‘[r]equiring, as the Chamber in effect does, specific research into the extent of
the obvious seems to me to be placing a very substantial, and retroactive, burden on the
Government’. He thought this to be a particularly influential point when the policy the
applicants are challenging is one (in his view) of macroeconomics.
In 2003, of course, the earlier views of both Judge Greve and Sir Brian Kerr coincided with
those of the majority and the evidential point was not explicitly explored again. Nevertheless,
the balance of proof, whether conceived in substantive or procedural terms, plainly underpins
the very essence of balancing. Indeed, this aspect is arguably much more critical than it at
first appears. As Greer submits, perhaps the ECtHR should be subject to a ‘requirement on
the defendant state to discharge a much more formal burden of proving, upon credible and
convincing grounds supported by reliable evidence, that interfering with the right in pursuit
of the specific public interest in question was proportionate to a pressing social need’.35 This
might then give greater priority to rights.
Lastly, it is worth noting that the majority in the Grand Chamber in Hatton also quashed the
tentative approaches towards environmental rights under the ECHR, holding categorically
that there ‘is no explicit right in the Convention to a clean and quiet environment’, only that
‘where an individual is directly and seriously affected by noise or other pollution, an issue
may arise under Article 8’.36 Instead they held that environmental protection:
should be taken into consideration by Governments in acting within their margin of appreciation
and by the Court in its review of that margin, but it would not be appropriate for the Court to
adopt a special approach in this respect by reference to a special status of environmental human
rights. In this context the Court must revert to the question of the scope of the margin of appreciation
available to the State when taking policy decisions of the kind at issue.37
Again the minority in 2003 disagreed. They argued that in:
the field of environmental human rights, which was practically unknown in 1950, the
Commission and the Court have increasingly taken the view that Article 8 embraces the right
to a healthy environment, and therefore to protection against pollution and nuisances caused
by harmful chemicals, offensive smells, agents which precipitate respiratory ailments, noise
and so on.38
35 Steven Greer, ‘Constitutionalizing Adjudication under the European Convention on Human Rights’,
above, at p. 428.
36 At para. 96.
37 At para. 122.
38 At para. 2 of their dissent.
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39 Only Judge Greve had mentioned (and dismissed) the concept in her partial dissent.
40 At para. 97, a statement vehemently opposed by Sir Brian Kerr in his dissent, who thought it an
unwarranted extension of the jurisprudence and one which could not be reconciled with the margin
of appreciation doctrine.
41 (1995) 20 EHRR 277.
42 (1998) 26 EHRR 357.
43 See for example, the debate between Miller and DeMerieux in M. DeMerieux, ‘Deriving
Environmental Rights from the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms’, (2001) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 21, 521 and Chris Miller,
‘Environmental Rights in a Welfare State? A Comment on DeMerieux’ (2003) Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies, Vol. 23, 111.
44 per Miller, ibid. at p. 115.
45 Hatton 2003, para. 120. For a discussion of this point see David Hart QC and Marina Wheeler, ‘Night
Flights and Strasbourg’s Retreat from Environmental Human Rights’, above, at p.133.
Similarly, although the Chamber had declined to formulate their decision in terms of an
environmental right,39 they had certainly taken a much more protective stance in 2001,
when they had concluded that it was the state’s duty to minimise, as far as possible, any
interference with Article 8 rights.40 Nevertheless, with the confirmation that no explicit
right to environment exists, the majority in the Grand Chamber returned the discussion to
the conventional analysis of the issue in terms of the margin of appreciation, relying on
relatively narrow interpretations in Powell and Rayner and Buckley rather than taking a more
proactive approach. By their approval of this aspect of Hatton, the House of Lords in Marcic
may perhaps be said to agree with this approach as well.
Admittedly, it is arguable to what extent the ECtHR was already developing a doctrine of
‘environmental rights’ under the Convention. Certainly, in Lopez Ostra v Spain41 and Guerra
v Italy,42 the Court had found breaches of Article 8 arising from a failure of public authorities
to control and publicise polluting activities yet commentators have differed in their views
over whether these cases constitute the development of environmental rights,43 particularly
on the role that ‘incompetence of the state authorities’44 or, as the Grand Chamber put it,
‘domestic irregularity’ played in the outcome of these cases.45 For the time being, however,
it seems that the Grand Chamber’s decision in Hatton has restricted such arguments and
that the development of environmental rights, if it was happening at all, will be less imminent
than it perhaps once appeared.
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